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ABSTRACT
Time and again, the Court of Justice has made clear that EU law does not protect natural 
or legal persons who seek to pay less tax by creating situations that artifi cially fall within 
the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms. In the light of the judgments of the 
Court of Justice in Cadbury Schweppes, Th in Cap and Glaxo Wellcome, this contribution 
describes the steps that a national court must follow when determining whether a particular 
behaviour constitutes an abuse of law in the fi eld of direct taxation.
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§1. INTRODUCTION
In the fi eld of direct taxation, it is of paramount constitutional importance to draw a 
conceptual distinction between ‘tax mitigation’ (or ‘tax avoidance’) and ‘tax evasion’, 
since that distinction is essential for the Court of Justice in determining the extent to 
which EU law places limits on the exercise of national taxing powers. On the one hand, 
the expression ‘tax mitigation’ relates to situations where an individual (or a company) 
seeks, in compliance with the law, to minimize the taxes he or she (or it) pays. In a 
cross-border context, tax mitigation is made possible by regulatory competition among 
the national tax systems. Given that the power to levy direct taxes remains with the 
Member States, the latter are, for example, free to ‘organise, in compliance with [EU] 
law, [their] system for taxing distributed profi ts and, in that context, to defi ne the tax 
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base and the tax rate which apply to the shareholder receiving them’.1 As Member States 
apply diff erent income and corporation tax rates, a natural (or legal) person may decide 
to exercise an economic activity in a Member State other than his or her (or its) state of 
residence so as to profi t from tax advantages. ‘[An EU] national’, the Court of Justice 
stated in Barbier, ‘cannot be deprived of the right to rely on the provisions of the Treaty 
on the ground that he is profi ting from tax advantages which are legally provided by the 
rules in force in a Member State other than his State of residence’.2 Consequently, the 
application of the fundamental freedoms cannot be ruled out by the fact that the exercise 
of such freedoms is motivated by a desire to mitigate tax liabilities.
On the other hand, an EU national may not rely on the fundamental freedoms in a 
way that undermines the eff ectiveness of the tax system of the Member State that has 
jurisdiction to tax him or her. In the Court of Justice’s words, ‘nationals of a Member 
State cannot attempt, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to 
circumvent their national legislation. Th ey must not improperly or fraudulently take 
advantage of provisions of [EU] law’.3 Accordingly, EU law does not protect natural or 
legal persons who seek to pay less tax by creating situations that artifi cially fall within 
the scope of application of the fundamental freedoms. Restrictions on the free movement 
of companies and capital which seek to prevent tax evasion and do not go beyond what 
is necessary to attain that objective are compatible with EU law. In summary, whilst a 
Member State may not prevent genuine tax mitigation, EU law does not provide a shield 
for tax evaders.
Logically, the question is then how to draw a distinction between those two concepts. 
To that end, the Court of Justice has developed the concept of ‘abuse of law’,4 according 
to which ‘a national measure restricting [a fundamental freedom] may be justifi ed 
where it specifi cally relates to wholly artifi cial arrangements aimed at circumventing the 
application of the legislation of the Member State concerned’.5 Th is means that a Member 
State may adopt measures which, whilst constituting a restriction on free movement, 
seek to prevent abusive practices and are thus able to be justifi ed.
1 See, e.g., Case C-374/04 Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:773, para. 
50; Case C-446/04 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:774, para. 47; Case C-194/06 
Orange European Smallcap Fund, EU:C:2008:289, para. 30; Case C-128/08 Damseaux, EU:C:2009:471, 
para. 25; Case C-284/09 Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2011:670, para. 45; and Case C-387/11 
Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:2012:670, para. 37.
2 Case C-364/01 Barbier, EU:C:2003:665, para. 71.
3 Case 115/78 Knoors, EU:C:1979:31, para. 25; Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha, EU:C:1990:343, para. 14; and 
Case C-212/97 Centros, EU:C:1999:126, para. 24.
4 See, generally, R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General 
Principle of EU Law? (Hart Publishing, 2011); and A. Saydé, ‘Defi ning the Concept of Abuse of Union 
Law’, 33 Yearbook of European Law (2014), p. 138–162.
5 See, to that eff ect Case C-264/96 ICI, EU:C:1998:370, para. 26; Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, 
EU:C:2002:749, para. 37; C-9/02 Lasteyrie du Saillant, EU:C:2004:138, para. 50; and Case C-446/03 
Marks & Spencer, EU:C:2005:763, para. 57.
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Th e purpose of my contribution is thus to explore the concept of ‘abuse of law’ as 
applied by the Court of Justice in the fi eld of direct taxation. To that eff ect, it is divided 
into three sections. Section 2 provides a very brief account of the evolution of the concept 
of ‘abuse of law’ in light of the case law of the Court of Justice, from its fi rst appearance in 
Van Binsbergen to its application in Halifax. Section 3 is devoted to examining Cad bury 
Schweppes,6 the landmark case in which the Court of Justice explained, for the fi rst time, 
the role played by the concept of abuse of law in the fi eld of direct taxation. Section 4 looks 
at two important direct taxation cases decided in the aft ermath of Cadbury Schweppes, 
namely Th in Cap7 and Gla xo Wellcome.8 Finally, a brief conclusion describes the steps 
that a national court must follow when determining whether a particular behaviour 
constitutes such an abuse (Section 5).
§2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
At fi rst, the Court of Justice did not provide a defi nition of abusive practices, but limited 
itself to acknowledging that Member States were, in principle, entitled to counter so-
called ‘U-turn’ or ‘circumvention’ transactions, that is
situations where either persons or goods move from one Member State to another, although 
the fi nal destination of the transaction is the original Member State; the central focus is the 
exercise of a right conferred by [EU] law, the right to free movement, in order to circumvent 
the national law of a Member State.9
In the key passage of Van Binsbergen, the fi rst case to which the doctrine of abuse can be 
traced, the Court of Justice ruled that
a Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to prevent the exercise by a person 
providing services whose activity is entirely or principally directed towards its territory of the 
freedom guaranteed by article [56 TFEU] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of 
conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within that state.10
However, as the Court of Justice made clear in Kefalas and Centros,11 the Van Binsbergen 
line of case law12 did not imply that Member States enjoy a ‘carte blanche in the application 
6 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas, EU:C:2006:544.
7 Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Th in Cap Group Litigation, EU:C:2007:161.
8 Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, EU:C:2009:559.
9 See R. De La Feria, ‘Prohibition of abuse of (Community) law: Th e creation of a new general principle 
of EC law through tax’, 45 Common Market Law Review (2008), p. 395–441, 399.
10 Case C-33/74 Van Binsbergen v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid, EU:C:1974:131, para. 27.
11 Case C-367/96 Kefalas, EU:C:1998:222; and Case C-212/97 Centros.
12 See, regarding the freedom to supply services, Case C-148/91 Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. 
Commissariaat voor de Media, EU:C:1993:45, para. 12; and Case C-23/93 TV 10 v. Commissariaat 
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of [their] own national anti-abuse provisions’.13 Th e Court of Justice declined to hold that 
national measures prohibiting ‘U-turn’ or ‘circumvention’ transactions fall outside the 
scope of application of the fundamental freedoms. In so far as those measures constitute 
a restriction on free movement, the fact that they seek to combat abusive practices must 
therefore be examined in terms of a possible justifi cation for such a restriction. As the 
Court of Justice pointed out in Kefalas,
the application of [a national rule, which provides that “the exercise of a right is prohibited 
where it manifestly exceeds the bounds of good faith, morality or the economic or social 
purpose of that right”,] must not prejudice the full eff ect and uniform application of [EU] law 
in the Member States (…). In particular, it is not open to national courts, when assessing the 
exercise of a right arising from a provision of [EU] law, to alter the scope of that provision or 
to compromise the objectives pursued by it.14
In the same way, in Centros, the Court of Justice ruled that the exercise of the right to free 
movement could not give rise to abuse in itself. For the Court of Justice,
the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to form 
it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the least restrictive and to 
set up branches in other Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of 
establishment.
‘Th e right to form a company in accordance with the law of a Member State and to set 
up branches in other Member States’, the Court of Justice also wrote, ‘is inherent in the 
exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the Treaty’.15 
Th us, Van Binsbergen, Kefalas and Centros all point to the need for a method of analysis 
capable of distinguishing situations involving the legitimate exercise of a fundamental 
freedom from those that give rise to abusive practices.
In Emsland-Stärke,16 the Court of Justice seized the opportunity to develop a test that 
would allow national courts to draw a distinction between those two types of situations. 
Th e facts of the case were as follows. Emsland-Stärke GmbH, a German company, 
exported several consignments of a potato-based product to Switzerland, for which it 
voor de Media, EU:C:1994:362, para. 21; regarding the freedom of establishment, Case 115/78 Knoors, 
para. 25; and Case C-61/89 Bouchoucha, para. 14; regarding the free movement of goods, Case 229/83 
Leclerc and Others v. Au Blé Vert and Others, EU:C:1985:1, para. 27; regarding social security, Case 
C-206/94 Brennet v. Paletta, EU:C:1996:182; regarding the free movement of workers, Case 39/86 Lair 
v. Universität Hannover, EU:C:1988:322, para. 43; regarding the common agricultural policy, Case 
C-8/92 General Milk Products v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, EU:C:1993:82, para. 21; and regarding 
company law, Case C-367/96 Kefalas, para. 20.
13 D. Weber, ‘Abuse of Law – European Court of Justice, 14 December 2000, Case C-110/99, Emsland-
Stärke’, 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2004), p. 43–55, 50.
14 Case C-367/96 Kefalas, para. 21 and 22.
15 Case C-212/97 Centros, para. 27.
16 Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke, EU:C:2000:695.
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received an export refund. Subsequently, inquiries conducted by the German customs 
authorities revealed that immediately aft er their release for home use in Switzerland, 
the exported consignments in question were transported – unaltered and by the same 
means of transport – to Italy or back to Germany. Hence, those authorities demanded 
that Emsland-Stärke GmbH repay the export refund. Taking the view that it had met the 
conditions for the grant of export refunds set out in Regulation No 2730/79,17 Emsland-
Stärke GmbH challenged that decision. Th us, the crux of the case was whether, in the 
event of a purely formal dispatch from the EU territory with the sole purpose of benefi ting 
from an export refund, Regulation No 2730/79 precluded an obligation to repay that 
refund. Th e Court of Justice replied in the negative: ‘the scope of [EU] regulations must 
in no case be extended to cover abuses on the part of a trader’.18 Next, the Court of Justice 
went on to explain what is to be understood by ‘abuse’. Th e key passages of the judgment 
merit quotation in full.
A fi nding of an abuse requires, fi rst, a combination of objective circumstances in which, 
despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the [EU] rules, the purpose of those 
rules has not been achieved.
It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage 
from the [EU] rules by creating artifi cially the conditions laid down for obtaining it. Th e 
existence of that subjective element can be established, inter alia, by evidence of collusion 
between the [EU] exporter receiving the refunds and the importer of the goods in the non-
member country.19
It was for the national court to establish whether the actions of Emsland-Stärke GmbH 
contained both objective and subjective elements that would lead to a fi nding of abuse. 
Emsland-Stärke is thus a seminal judgment which laid down, for the fi rst time, ‘the 
criteria for determining the existence of abuse for the purposes of EU law’.20 However, 
that judgment left  open one important question, namely whether that defi nition of abuse 
was limited to the fi eld of agricultural levies or whether it could be extrapolated to other 
areas of the EU legal order, notably to the fi eld of taxation.
In Halifax,21 a case concerning the interpretation of the Sixth VAT Directive,22 the 
Court of Justice replied in the affi  rmative to the latter part of that question. In that case, 
17 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2730/79 of 29  November 1979 laying down common detailed 
rules for the application of the system of export refunds on agricultural products, [1979] OJ L 317/1 
(repealed).
18 Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke, para. 51.
19 Ibid., para. 52 and 53.
20 R. De la Feria, 45 CML Rev (2008), p. 410. See also D. Weber, 31 LIEI (2004), p. 51.
21 Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others, EU:C:2006:121.
22 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to turnover taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, 
[1977] OJ L 145/1.
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Halifax, a banking company, wished to build new call centres in Northern Ireland. Since 
most of its services were exempt from VAT, it was only able to recover a small portion of 
the input tax for which it was liable, namely 5% of the VAT paid for construction works. 
However, following the tax planning scheme elaborated by its advisers, Halifax decided 
to set up a series of transactions involving diff erent companies of the Halifax group 
which, in principle, enabled it to recover all of the input VAT paid in respect of those 
construction works. It applied for repayment of the input VAT paid for those works, 
but the UK tax authorities rejected its application on the ground that a transaction 
entered into solely for the purpose of VAT avoidance was neither itself a ‘supply’, nor a 
step taken in the course or furtherance of an ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of 
the Sixth Directive. Accordingly, the referring court asked the Court of Justice whether 
transactions of the kind at issue in the case at hand indeed constituted ‘supplies of goods 
or services’ and ‘economic activity’ within the meaning of the Sixth VAT Directive 
where the sole purpose of those transactions was to obtain a tax advantage. In that 
regard, the Court of Justice pointed out that the purpose pursued by those transactions 
was irrelevant, in so far as they satisfi ed the objective criteria on which the concepts of 
‘supplies of goods or services’ and ‘economic activity’ are based.
In addition, the UK tax authorities argued that, in light of the general principle of 
EU law preventing ‘abuse of rights’, those transactions should be disregarded and the 
terms of the Sixth VAT Directive applied to the true nature of the transactions at issue. 
Th e referring court thus asked the Court of Justice whether the right to deduct input 
VAT was ruled out where the transactions on which that right was based constituted an 
abusive practice. Th e Court of Justice began by recalling the key passage in Emsland-
Stärke, according to which ‘[t]he application of [EU] legislation cannot be extended to 
cover abusive practices by economic operators, that is to say transactions carried out not 
in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully 
obtaining advantages provided for by [EU] law’.23 Hence, the Court of Justice made 
clear that ‘[the] principle of prohibiting abusive practices [as defi ned by the case law] 
also applies to the sphere of VAT’.24 Th is did not mean, however, that the Sixth VAT 
Directive opposed tax planning. ‘[T]axpayers’, the Court of Justice stressed, ‘may choose 
to structure their business so as to limit their tax liability’.25 Just as it did in Emsland-
Stärke, the Court of Justice was thus obliged to provide the national court with a method 
of analysis capable of distinguishing between legitimate and abusive VAT transactions. 
To that eff ect, it noted that an abusive practice takes place where:
(…) fi rst, the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions 
laid down by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and the national legislation 
23 Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others, para. 69.
24 Ibid., para. 70.
25 Ibid., para. 73.
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transposing it, result in the accrual of a tax advantage the grant of which would be contrary to 
the purpose of those provisions.
Second, it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of 
the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage.26
It was for the national court to make those determinations. With regard to the fi rst 
element, the national court had to take into account the principles underpinning the 
VAT system, in particular the complete neutrality of taxation of all economic activities 
and the existence of a direct and immediate link between a particular input transaction 
and a particular output transaction. Accordingly,
[t]o allow taxable persons to deduct all input VAT even though, in the context of their normal 
commercial operations, no transactions conforming with the deduction rules of the Sixth 
Directive or of the national legislation transposing it would have enabled them to deduct such 
VAT, or would have allowed them to deduct only a part, would be contrary to the principle of 
fi scal neutrality and, therefore, contrary to the purpose of those rules.27
As to the second element, the national court had to ‘determine the real substance and 
signifi cance of the transactions concerned. In so doing, it may take account of the purely 
artifi cial nature of those transactions and the links of a legal, economic and/or personal 
nature between the operators involved in the scheme for reduction of the tax burden’.28 
If those two conditions were met, those transactions constituted an abusive practice and, 
as such, ‘[had to] be redefi ned so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed 
in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice’.29
It is worth noting that, unlike Emsland-Stärke, Halifax contains no explicit reference 
to the ‘subjective element’ of abuse.30 Th at silence may be explained by the criticisms put 
forward by some scholars and Advocates General before the Court of Justice delivered its 
judgment in Halifax.31 In particular, in his Opinion in Halifax, Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro argued that the subjective intention of those claiming the EU right in question 
is not ‘decisive for the assessment of abuse. It is instead the activity itself, objectively 
considered’.32 Indeed, for the Advocate General, ‘the intentions of the parties to (…) 
obtain [improperly] an advantage from [EU] law are merely inferable from the artifi cial 
character of the situation to be assessed in the light of a set of objective circumstances’.33 
26 Ibid., para. 74 and 75.
27 Ibid., para. 80.
28 Ibid., para. 81.
29 Ibid., para. 94.
30 R. De la Feria, 45 CML Rev (2008), p. 423.
31 For an overview of those criticisms, see D. Weber, 31 LIEI (2004), p. 53 et seq.
32 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-255/02 Halifax and Others, EU:C:2005:200, 
para. 70.
33 Ibid., para. 71.
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Arguably, a possible reading of Halifax suggests that the existence of objective factors 
may suffi  ce to demonstrate that a transaction involves an abusive practice.34
§3. CADBURY SCHWEPPES
Th e logical question that arose following Halifax was whether the concept of abuse of 
law could be applied to cases involving direct taxation. Unlike VAT, direct taxation is not 
harmonized at EU level. Arguably, one could support the contention that an autonomous 
EU concept of abuse of law, developed by the Court of Justice, may only be applied in 
those areas in which the EU legislator has exercised its competences. Th e argument then 
runs that in the absence of such harmonization, the defi nition of that concept should be 
left  to national law.35 In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court of Justice was confronted with 
that very question.
It is true that Cadbury Schweppes was not the fi rst direct taxation case in which the 
Court of Justice had to examine the compatibility with EU law of national measures 
prohibiting ‘circumvention’ transactions. Previously, the Court of Justice had already 
ruled that Member States could pass legislation ‘specifi cally target[ing] wholly artifi cial 
arrangements’.36 However, the Court of Justice had seen no need to lay down criteria 
identifying those arrangements, given that the national measures at issue had such a 
broad scope of application that it was clear that they were not ‘specifi cally designed’ to 
counter them.37 Cadbury Schweppes off ered a good opportunity for the Court of Justice 
to explain what the expression ‘wholly artifi cial arrangements’ actually meant.
In that case, the Court of Justice had to determine whether a national court could 
have recourse to the concept of abuse of law as developed in the case law with a view to 
examining the compatibility with the freedom of establishment of UK corporation tax 
law. Th e legal background of the case was as follows. In the UK, a UK resident parent 
company was not, as a general rule, taxed on the profi ts made by a subsidiary as they 
arose, where that subsidiary was established abroad. However, the UK legislation on 
controlled foreign companies (‘CFCs’, that is, foreign companies in which the resident 
parent company owns a holding of more than 50%) established an exception to that 
general rule: the profi ts made by a CFC are attributed to the UK parent company and 
34 P. Pistone, ‘Abuse of Law in the Context of Indirect Taxation: From (before) Emsland-Stärke 1 to 
Halifax (and Beyond)’, in R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New 
General Principle of EU Law?, p. 387 (who argues that Halifax confi rms that ‘the existence of objective 
factors [is] suffi  cient for detecting the existence of abusive practices’).
35 R. De la Feria, 45 CML Rev (2008), p. 425.
36 See, e.g., Case C-264/96 ICI, para. 26.
37 See more recently, Case C-330/07 Jobra, EU:C:2008:685. See also R. De la Feria, 45 CML Rev (2008), 
p.  424 and 425; and M. Lang, ‘Cadbury Schweppes’ Line of Case Law from the Member State’s 
Perspective’, in R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General 
Principle of EU Law?, p. 436.
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included in the parent company’s tax base, although they had not been received by that 
company, where the CFC was subject to a ‘lower level of taxation’ in the Member State in 
which it was established.38 However, the taxation provided for by the legislation on CFCs 
did not apply where the CFC adopted an ‘acceptable distribution policy’,39 was engaged 
in ‘exempt activities’, satisfi ed the ‘public quotation condition’,40 or fell below the de 
minimis threshold laid down therein.41
In addition, that taxation was also excluded where the CFC concerned met the 
‘motive test’ which laid down two cumulative conditions. First, in relation to transactions 
between the CFC and the parent company which produced a reduction in UK taxation 
and that exceeded a minimum amount, the taxpayer had to show that the reduction in 
UK tax was not the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, of those transactions. 
Second, concerning the reasons for the establishment of the CFC, the taxpayer had 
to show that achieving a reduction in UK tax by means of the diversion of profi ts was 
not the main reason, or one of the main reasons, for the subsidiary’s existence in that 
accounting period.
As to the facts of the case, Cadbury Schweppes (CS), the UK resident parent company 
of the Cadbury Schweppes group, owned – indirectly through a chain of subsidiaries 
belonging to that group at the head of which was Cadbury Schweppes Overseas (CSO) – 
two subsidiaries in Ireland, namely Cadbury Schweppes Treasury Services (CSTS) and 
Cadbury Schweppes Treasury International (CSTI). Th e business of the latter was to 
raise fi nance and to provide that fi nance to other subsidiaries in the Cadbury Schweppes 
group. CSTS and CSTI were established in Ireland in order that the profi ts related to the 
internal fi nancing activities of the Cadbury Schweppes group could benefi t from the tax 
regime of the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin (the IFSC), according to 
which companies established therein were subject to a tax rate of 10%. Taking the view 
that CSTS and CSTI were subject to ‘a lower level of taxation’, the UK tax authorities 
decided that, in accordance with the legislation on CFCs, the profi ts made by CSTI for 
the 1996 fi nancial year had to be attributed to CSO.42 Th ose authorities thus claimed 
back corporation tax from CSO in the sum of £ 8 million. CS and CSO challenged that 
decision on the ground that the taxation provided for by the legislation on CFCs was 
contrary to the freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free 
movement of capital.
38 A ‘lower level of taxation’ took place where ‘the tax paid by the CFC [was] less than three quarters of the 
amount of tax which would have been paid in the [UK] on the taxable profi ts as they would have been 
calculated for the purposes of taxation in that Member State’. Ibid., para. 7.
39 At the material time (1996), this meant that 90% of the CFC’s profi ts had to be distributed within 18 
months of their arising and taxed in the hands of the UK resident company.
40 Th is meant that 35% of the voting rights were held by the public, the subsidiary was quoted and its 
securities were traded in on a recognized stock exchange.
41 Th e CFC’s chargeable profi ts did not exceed £ 50,000.
42 As CSTS made a loss in that year, no profi ts could be attributed to CSO.
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At the outset, the Court of Justice examined which of those three fundamental 
freedoms applied to the case at hand. Since the legislation at issue in the main proceedings 
only applied to foreign companies in which the UK resident parent company owned 
a holding of more than 50%, ‘giving [the latter company] defi nite infl uence on the 
[foreign companies’] decisions and allowing [it] to determine [their] activities’,43 that 
legislation came within the substantive scope of the provisions of the Treaty on freedom 
of establishment. In addition, the Court of Justice held that the fact that companies set 
up a subsidiary in a Member State other than their state of residence for the purpose of 
reducing their tax liability does not in itself constitute abuse.44 Nor may that fact rule 
out the application of the freedom of establishment. Next, the Court of Justice held that 
the UK legislation on CFCs constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment. It 
observed that, whilst the profi ts made by subsidiaries established in the UK were never 
attributed to their resident parent company, the same did not hold true in relation to 
subsidiaries established outside that Member State.45 Such a diff erence in treatment 
entailed a disadvantage for resident companies having subsidiaries outside the UK, thus 
‘dissuading them from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Member 
State in which the latter is subject to [a lower] level of taxation’.46
As to the justifi cation, the UK government argued that the legislation on CFCs was 
intended to counter a specifi c type of tax avoidance involving the artifi cial transfer by a 
resident company of profi ts from the Member State in which they were made to a low-tax 
jurisdiction by means of the establishment of a subsidiary in the latter and the setting up 
of transactions intended primarily to make such a transfer to that subsidiary. To begin 
with, the Court of Justice recalled that the need to protect tax revenue is neither one of 
the grounds listed in Article 52(1) TFEU nor a reason of overriding general interest that 
might justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment.47 Similarly, it recalled that one 
cannot generally presume that a company is evading taxes merely because that company 
decides to exercise its freedom of establishment by setting up a subsidiary in another 
Member State.48 However, a restriction on the freedom of establishment may be justifi ed 
‘where it specifi cally relates to wholly artifi cial arrangements aimed at circumventing the 
application of the legislation of the Member State concerned’.49 Stated simply, restrictions 
on free movement which seek to counter abusive practices may be justifi ed.
In order to determine the artifi cial nature of an arrangement, the Court of Justice 
stated that it was necessary to examine the objective pursued by the freedom of 
43 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 31.
44 Ibid., para. 37 and 38.
45 Ibid., para. 45.
46 Ibid., para. 46.
47 Ibid., para. 49 (referring to Case C-136/00 Danner, EU:C:2002:558, para. 56; and Case C-422/01 Skandia 
and Ramstedt, EU:C:2003:380, para. 53).
48 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 50 (referring to Case C-264/96 ICI, para. 26).
49 Ibid., para. 51.
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establishment, which is to ‘allow a national of a Member State to set up a secondary 
establishment in another Member State to carry on his activities there and thus assist 
economic and social interpenetration within the [EU] in the sphere of activities as self-
employed persons’.50 Since the freedom of establishment pursues integration in the 
host Member State, the Court of Justice ruled that that freedom ‘presupposes actual 
establishment of the company concerned in the host Member State and the pursuit of 
genuine economic activity there’.51 Accordingly, in the key passage of the judgment the 
Court of Justice stated that
(…) in order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justifi ed on the ground 
of prevention of abusive practices, the specifi c objective of such a restriction must be to 
prevent conduct involving the creation of wholly artifi cial arrangements which do not refl ect 
economic reality, with a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profi ts generated by 
activities carried out on national territory.52
As to the case at hand, the Court of Justice examined whether the UK legislation on 
CFCs was capable of preventing wholly artifi cial arrangements and, if so, whether it went 
beyond what was necessary to attain that objective. ‘By providing for the inclusion of the 
profi ts of a CFC subject to [a] very favourable tax regime in the tax base of the resident 
company’, the Court of Justice wrote, ‘the legislation on CFCs makes it possible to thwart 
practices which have no purpose other than to escape the tax normally due on the profi ts 
generated by activities carried on in national territory’.53 Regarding the necessity of that 
legislation, the Court of Justice held, quoting Emsland-Stärke and Halifax, that
[i]n order to fi nd that there is such an arrangement there must be, in addition to a subjective 
element consisting in the intention to obtain a tax advantage, objective circumstances showing 
that, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by [EU] law, the objective pursued 
by [the] freedom of establishment [i.e., the pursuit of genuine economic activity in the host 
Member State], has not been achieved.54
Accordingly, in situations where, despite the existence of tax motives, the incorporation 
of a CFC refl ects economic reality, the profi ts of such a CFC cannot be included 
in the tax base of the resident parent company without infringing the freedom of 
establishment. Th ose circumstances relate to objective factors which are ascertainable 
by third parties with regard, in particular, to the extent to which the CFC physically 
exists in terms of premises, staff  and equipment.55 If those factors show that the CFC 
50 Ibid., para. 53.
51 Ibid., para. 54.
52 Ibid., para. 55.
53 Ibid., para. 59.
54 Ibid., para. 64.
55 Ibid., para. 67.
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does not carry on a genuine economic activity in the host Member State, its creation is 
to be considered as a wholly artifi cial arrangement (for example a ‘letter box’ or ‘front’ 
subsidiary).56 Procedurally, the Court of Justice held that the resident company ‘must 
be given an opportunity to produce evidence that the CFC is actually established and 
that its activities are genuine’.57 In the same way, with a view to obtaining the necessary 
information regarding a CFC’s true situation, the UK may have recourse to Directive 
77/799.58 Specifi cally in this case, the UK could have also relied on the double taxation 
convention (DTC) it had concluded with Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fi scal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains of 
2 June 1976. As to the ‘motive test’ set out in the UK legislation on CFCs, it was for the 
national court to determine whether the scope of application of that test was limited to 
preventing ‘wholly artifi cial arrangements’.
One may draw fi ve direct implications from the ruling of the Court of Justice in 
Cadbury Schweppes. First, and foremost, the Court of Justice stressed the fact that 
the home Member State must be able to counter wholly artifi cial arrangements which 
undermine its tax jurisdiction in relation to the activities carried out on its territory. 
Otherwise, the balance between Member States in terms of allocation of the power to 
impose taxes would be jeopardized.59 Th is shows that there is a close relationship between 
the objectives of combating tax evasion and of safeguarding a balanced allocation of 
the power to tax between Member States,60 notably where the case at hand concerns 
the cross-border off setting of losses.61 In that regard, the Court of Justice has held that, 
where the objective of safeguarding a balanced allocation of the power to tax between 
Member States justifi es the national legislation at issue, the fact that such legislation ‘is 
not specifi cally designed to [combat tax evasion does not prevent it from being] regarded 
as proportionate to the objectives pursued, taken as a whole’.62 Conversely, where such 
a balanced allocation of the power to tax is not at stake, the national measures seeking 
to prevent tax evasion must be specifi cally designed to counter abusive practices, that is, 
their scope must be limited to prohibiting wholly artifi cial arrangements which do not 
refl ect economic reality.
56 Ibid., para. 68.
57 Ibid., para. 70.
58 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by the competent 
authorities of the Member States in the fi eld of direct taxation, [1977] OJ L 336/15. See also Council 
Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative cooperation in the fi eld of taxation and 
repealing Directive 77/799/EEC, [2011] OJ L 64/1.
59 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 56 (referring to Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, para. 46).
60 See, for example, Case C-318/10, SIAT, EU:C:2012:415, para. 48. See M. Schaper, ‘Th e Need to Prevent 
Abusive Practices and Fraud as a Composite Justifi cation’, 23 EC Tax Review (2014), p. 220–229.
61 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, EU:C:2007:439; and Case C-311/08 SGI, EU:C:2010:26.
62 Case C-231/05 Oy AA, para. 63; and Case C-311/08 SGI, para. 66. See, in this regard, M. Schaper, 23 
EC Tax Review (2014), p. 221 (who argues that ‘the need to prevent abusive practices and fraud can be 
construed as a composite of the need to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers and the 
need to ensure eff ective fi scal supervision’).
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In Felixstowe, for example, aft er holding that the need to safeguard a balanced 
allocation of the power to tax between Member States was not at issue in the main 
proceedings,63 the Court of Justice held that the contested UK legislation did not seek 
to combat tax evasion either. Th e reason was that that legislation ‘in no way pursue[d] 
a specifi c objective of combating purely artifi cial arrangements, but [was] designed to 
grant a tax advantage to companies that are members of groups generally, and in the 
context of consortia in particular’.64
Second, the Court of Justice recalled that ‘the mere fact that a resident company 
establishes a secondary establishment, such as a subsidiary, in another Member State 
cannot set up a general presumption of tax evasion and justify a measure which 
compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty’.65 It 
follows that Member States cannot prevent bona fi de tax mitigation.
Th ird, where the setting-up of a subsidiary in the host Member State does not refl ect 
economic reality, the objective pursued by the freedom of establishment has not been 
achieved.66 Hence, such establishment constitutes a wholly artifi cial arrangement which 
does not entitle taxpayers to obtain a more favourable tax treatment in the home Member 
State.
Fourth, the concept of abuse of law comprises both subjective and objective elements. 
Subjectively, the person or company concerned must have the intention of obtaining 
a tax advantage by creating wholly artifi cial arrangements.67 Objectively, in order to 
determine the existence of a wholly artifi cial arrangement, one must look at objective 
factors ascertainable by third parties which prove that the subsidiary at issue does not 
carry out a genuine economic activity in the host Member State. For example, those 
63 Case C-80/12 Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company and Others, EU:C:2014:200, para. 30.
64 Ibid., para. 34. Arguably, a joint reading of Oy AA, SGI and Felixstowe clarifi es how those two objectives 
are to interact with one another. Compare D. Weber, ‘Abuse of Law in European Tax Law: An Overview 
and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 2’, 53 European 
Taxation (2013), p. 313–328, 321–322.
65 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 50 (referring to Case C-264/96 ICI, para. 26; Case C-478/98 
Commission v. Belgium, EU:C:2000:497, para. 45; Case C-436/00 X and Y, EU:C:2002:704, para. 62; and 
Case C-334/02 Commission v. France, EU:C:2004:129, para. 27). See also C-9/02 Lasteyrie du Saillant, 
para. 51; and Case C-371/10 National Grid Indus, EU:C:2011:785, para. 84.
66 For a discussion on the concept of ‘economic reality’, see, e.g., D. Weber, ‘Abuse of Law in European Tax 
Law: An Overview and Some Recent Trends in the Direct and Indirect Tax Case Law of the ECJ – Part 
1’, 53 European Taxation (2013), p. 251–264, 257.
67 Some scholars have criticized the usefulness of the subjective element. See, e.g., M. Lang, in R. de la 
Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?, p. 448. 
Compare D. Weber, 53 European Taxation (2013), p. 257 (who opines that the principle of legal certainty 
and the principle of legality would oppose denying a tax advantage to a taxpayer who has relied on the 
clear wording of the law and has no intention of obtaining such an advantage by means of wholly 
artifi cial arrangements. In those circumstances, the author posits that ‘the fact that it can be established 
that a certain treatment is in confl ict with the object and scope of a provision is not suffi  cient to come 
to the conclusion that abuse is present’. In his view, abuse is present, in so far as the taxpayer has the 
intention to abuse).
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factors could examine whether the subsidiary physically exists in terms of premises, staff  
and equipment. Moreover, the Court of Justice pointed out that there is no abuse of the 
freedom of establishment where the subsidiary carries out a genuine economic activity, 
regardless of whether its establishment in a particular jurisdiction is motivated by the 
desire to mitigate tax liability.
Fift h, some scholars posit that the concept of abuse of law applied by the Court of 
Justice in Cadbury Schweppes is narrower than that applied by the Court of Justice 
in Halifax.68 Indeed, whilst in the former case, the Court of Justice defi ned ‘abusive 
practices’ as ‘wholly artifi cial arrangements’, in the latter case it held that ‘the essential 
aim of the transactions concerned is to obtain a tax advantage’. Later, in Part Service,69 
another VAT case, the Court of Justice clarifi ed that the expression ‘essential aim 
of the transaction’ is not to be interpreted as meaning ‘the sole aim pursued by the 
transaction’, but as denoting ‘the principal aim of the transaction or transactions in 
question’.70 Th is means that, in the context of VAT, a national court may fi nd that an 
arrangement constitutes abuse, ‘notwithstanding the possible existence, in addition, of 
economic objectives arising from, for example, marketing, organisation or guarantee 
considerations’.71
For Vanistendael, the fact that Halifax and Part Service concerned purely internal 
situations may explain why the concept of abuse applied by the Court of Justice in the 
context of VAT litigation is broader than that applied in direct taxation cases. In his view, 
in those two cases, the national court ‘was dealing with [a problem of] interpretation 
that was very much akin to the interpretation of a national tax rule’.72 Th e Court of 
Justice was therefore right to adopt a more fl exible concept of abuse which grants 
national courts a margin of appreciation. Besides, he argues that ‘cross-border abuses 
had to do with VAT carousels, which could be easily classifi ed as an abuse, because there 
is no redeeming Union virtue in these carousels, except for the naked desire for a tax 
advantage’.73 However, situations involving a fundamental freedom are diff erent. In 
Cadbury Schweppes, there was a clear EU interest in making sure that in order to prevent 
the reduction of tax revenues, national authorities did not ‘abuse’ the concept of ‘abuse of 
law’, by depriving individuals of the tax advantages accompanying a legitimate exercise 
68 R. De la Feria, 45 CML Rev (2008), p. 428. See also F. Vanistendael, ‘Cadbury Schweppes and Abuse from 
an EU Tax Law Perspective’, in R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A 
New General Principle of EU Law?, p. 422 (who argues that ‘[t]he diff erence is that under the [Cadbury 
Schweppes] ruling, any other reason than a tax advantage is suffi  cient to keep at bay the abuse concept, 
whilst under the [Part Service] holding there may be a mix of tax and non-tax reasons, but if the tax 
reasons are more important or even one of the important reasons, abuse is established’).
69 Case C-425/06 Part Service, EU:C:2008:108.
70 Ibid., para. 45.
71 Ibid., para. 62.
72 See, in this regard, Case C-285/09 R, EU:C:2010:742. See also F. Vanistendael, in R. de la Feria and S. 
Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General Principle of EU Law?, p. 423.
73 Ibid.
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of the right to free movement. To that end, the Court of Justice decided to limit the 
concept of abuse to ‘wholly artifi cial transactions’.74
§4. THIN CAP AND GLAXO WELLCOME
A. THIN CAP: ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES ON THIN CAPITALISATION
Th is case concerned the compatibility with the freedom of establishment of UK anti-
avoidance rules which were targeted at ‘thin capitalisation’. Th in capitalisation consists 
in fi nancing a company by way of loan in preference to equity capital, in order to 
benefi t from a more advantageous tax treatment.75 Previously, in Lankhorst-Hohorst, 
the Court of Justice had examined the compatibility with EU law of German rules on 
thin capitalisation. However, the scope of those rules was too broad, as they applied 
generally to any situation in which the parent company had its seat, for whatever reason, 
in another Member State.76 By contrast, in Th in Cap, the UK legislator had progressively 
adapted its legislation so as to avoid such over-inclusiveness. Accordingly, Th in Cap was 
the fi rst case in which the Court of Justice was called upon to apply the concept of abuse 
set out in Cadbury Schweppes.
Th e UK legislation in force up until 1995 provided that interest paid by a resident 
company was, in principle, treated as a distribution to the extent that it represented more 
than a reasonable commercial return on the loan in question. However, where the loan 
was granted by a non-resident company to a resident company, the interest paid for that 
74 Commentators have also compared the ruling of the Court of Justice in Cadbury Schweppes with that in 
Centros. See, generally, R. de la Feria and S. Vogenauer (eds.), Prohibition of Abuse of Law: A New General 
Principle of EU Law?. See also V. Edwards and P. Farmer, ‘Th e Concept of Abuse in the Freedom of 
Establishment of Companies: A Case of Double Standards?’, in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and T. Tridimas 
(eds.), Continuity and Change in EU Law Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (OUP, 2008), p. 205; L. 
Cerioni, ‘Th e “Abuse of Rights” in EU Company Law and EU Tax Law: A Re-reading of the ECJ Case 
Law and the Quest for a Unitary Notion’, 21 European Business Law Review (2010), p. 783–813; and A. 
Saydé, 33 YEL (2014), p. 162. For the purpose of this contribution, it suffi  ces to say that the ruling of the 
Court of Justice in Centros is consistent with Article 54 TFEU, since that Treaty provision allows room 
for regulatory competition in the fi eld of company law. Each Member State is free to choose between 
the ‘registered offi  ce’, the ‘central administration’ or the ‘principal place of business’ as the decisive 
criterion that determines the application of its company law. Notably, this means that a Member State 
may not refuse the registration of a branch of a company whose registered offi  ce is in another Member 
State simply because the latter Member State follows the incorporation doctrine. Similarly, Cadbury 
Schweppes may not be read as ruling out regulatory competition in the fi eld of direct taxation. In the 
absence of EU harmonization in that fi eld, it is for each Member State to determine the level of taxation 
it wishes to apply. Accordingly, a resident company may rely on its right to free movement in order to 
obtain a more favourable tax treatment in the host Member State, provided that the branch of such a 
company carries out a genuine economic activity in that Member State.
75 In this regard, see Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in Case C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Th in 
Cap Group Litigation, EU:C:2006:436, para. 3–5.
76 Case C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst, para. 37.
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loan was treated as a distributed profi t – and that, regardless of whether that interest 
represented a reasonable commercial return on that loan –, unless the UK had concluded 
a DTC to the contrary. In accordance with those conventions, the interest paid for that 
loan was deductible where the amount of interest did not exceed what would have been 
paid on an arm’s length basis. Between 1995 and 2004, the UK legislator amended those 
rules in the following terms. Interest paid by one company to another belonging to the 
same group of companies was treated as a distribution to the extent to which that interest 
exceeded the amount that would have been paid at arm’s length between the payer and 
the payee of the interest, or between those parties and a third party. However, those rules 
did not apply when both the borrowing company and the lending company were subject 
to tax in the United Kingdom.
At the outset, the Court of Justice noted that, since UK anti-avoidance rules only 
applied in relation to companies which controlled or exercised a defi nite infl uence over 
the borrowing company, the freedom of establishment applied to those rules.77 Next, the 
Court of Justice found that there was a diff erence in treatment according to the place 
in which the lending company had its seat. Where the lending company had its seat in 
the UK, the borrowing company could deduct the interest it paid under the loan from 
its taxable profi ts. Conversely, where the lending company had its seat in a Member 
State other than the UK, such deduction was, in principle, excluded, thus increasing the 
liability of the borrowing company to tax. By putting a resident borrowing company 
receiving loans from a non-resident company in a less advantageous position than that 
of a resident borrowing company receiving loans from resident company, UK anti-
avoidance rules constituted a restriction on the freedom of establishment. Indeed, those 
rules made it less attractive for companies established in a Member State other than the 
UK to acquire, create or maintain a subsidiary in the latter Member State.
As to the justifi cation, the UK argued that its anti-avoidance rules sought to fi ght 
abusive practices.78 In recalling its case law, the Court of Justice concurred with the UK in 
that Member States are entitled to adopt measures specifi cally targeted to ‘wholly artifi cial 
arrangements designed to circumvent the legislation of the Member State concerned’.79 
However, it pointed out that ‘[t]he mere fact that a resident company is granted a loan by 
a related company which is established in another Member State cannot be the basis of a 
general presumption of abusive practices and justify a measure which compromises the 
exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty’.80
As a next step in its reasoning, the Court of Justice proceeded to examine whether 
UK anti-avoidance rules complied with the principle of proportionality. In this regard, it 
77 Case C-524/04 Th in Cap, para. 35.
78 Th e UK government also argued that its anti-avoidance rules sought to preserve the coherence of its 
tax system. However, the Court of Justice found no link between the tax advantage concerned and the 
off setting of that advantage by a particular tax. Case C-524/04 Th in Cap, para. 68 and 69.
79 Ibid., para. 79.
80 Ibid., para. 73.
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found that those rules were capable of protecting the tax jurisdiction of the UK over the 
activities carried out on its territory. Indeed, they ‘prevent[ed] practices the sole purpose 
of which [was] to avoid the tax that would normally be payable on profi ts generated 
by activities undertaken in the national territory’.81 As to the necessity of the rules 
in question, the Court of Justice began by recalling that in order for the restriction at 
issue to be justifi ed, it had to have the specifi c purpose of preventing wholly artifi cial 
arrangements designed to circumvent that legislation.82 In that regard, it recognized that 
‘[t]he fact that a resident company has been granted a loan by a non-resident company 
on terms which do not correspond to those which would have been agreed upon at arm’s 
length may constitute an objective element of abuse that can be independently verifi ed’.83
Procedurally, the Court of Justice ruled that the taxpayer concerned had to be given 
the opportunity – without being subject to undue administrative constraints – to provide 
evidence showing that the transactions in question had a commercial justifi cation. 
In addition, where those transactions are considered to be ‘wholly artifi cial’, ‘the re-
characterisation of interest paid as a distribution is limited to the proportion of that 
interest which exceeds what would have been agreed had the relationship between the 
parties or between those parties and a third party been one at arm’s length’.84 Th e question 
whether the successive sets of UK anti-avoidance rules went beyond what was necessary 
to combat abusive practices was a question for the national court to determine.
By contrast, in ITELCAR, the Court of Justice had enough information at its disposal 
to rule that the Portuguese legislation at issue in the main proceedings went beyond 
what was necessary in order to combat abusive practices.85 Th at legislation provided that, 
where a resident company paid interest applied to the part of an overall debt categorized as 
excessive to a lending company established in a third country with which the borrowing 
company had special relations, that interest was not deductible as an expense for the 
purposes of determining taxable profi t. Conversely, such interest was deductible where it 
was paid to a resident lending company with which the resident borrowing company had 
special relations. At the outset, the Court of Justice noted that the Portuguese legislation 
constituted a restriction on the free movement of capital given that it was liable to deter 
a resident company from entering into a credit agreement with a company established 
in a third country. In seeking to combat tax evasion by preventing the practice of ‘thin 
capitalisation’, the Court of Justice recognized that the Portuguese legislation pursued a 
legitimate objective.
Next, the Court of Justice went on to examine whether that legislation complied 
with the principle of proportionality. Where the lending company established in a third 
country had a shareholding in the resident borrowing company, the Court of Justice 
81 Ibid., para. 77.
82 Ibid., para. 79.
83 Ibid., para. 80.
84 Ibid., para. 83.
85 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR and Fazenda Pública, EU:C:2013:629.
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found that the corrective tax measure complied with the principle of proportionality in 
so far as the non-deductible interest was confi ned to the part of the transaction which 
exceeded that which would have been agreed on an arm’s length basis.86 Th is was not 
however the case where the lending company established in a third country with which 
the resident borrowing company had special relations did not have a shareholding in 
that company. In the absence of such a shareholding, the overall debt owned by the 
resident borrowing company to the lending company was considered to be part of an 
arrangement designed to avoid the tax normally payable.87 Th at assumption was, in the 
Court of Justice’s view, disproportionate as it applied to conduct the economic reality of 
which could not be disputed.
B. GLAXO WELLCOME: LIMITING OFFSETTING REDUCTION IN 
SHARE VALUES
In Glaxo Wellcome, the legal framework was as follows: in order to avoid double economic 
taxation of the profi ts distributed by companies resident in Germany to resident 
taxpayers, German law gave those taxpayers the right to off set in full the corporation 
tax paid by the distributing companies against their own income tax or corporation tax 
liability. In addition to that tax credit, a resident taxpayer was entitled to deduct from 
his taxable profi ts the reduction in value of the shares he held in a resident company 
which resulted from the distribution of dividends. Th is was because from the point of 
view of the German legislature, the distribution of dividends did not generate income. 
Accordingly, if the taxpayer did not have any other income in the year in question, that 
tax credit was converted into a right to a refund. Moreover, the sale of shares above 
their nominal value constituted income for the purposes of German law and was liable 
to income or corporation tax. However, German law provided that a resident taxpayer 
was not entitled to deduct from his taxable profi ts the losses resulting from the partial 
reduction in value of the shares he held in a resident company where he had acquired his 
shares from a shareholder residing in another Member State (the ‘contested legislation’).
With regard to non-resident taxpayers, their income from the distribution of profi ts 
of resident companies and the profi ts arising from the sale of shares in such companies 
were not liable to income or corporation tax in Germany. Non-resident taxpayers were 
also unable to invoke the application of the imputation system in full in respect of the 
profi ts distributed to them by resident companies: therefore they could not obtain a tax 
credit equal to the tax paid by the resident distributing company.
Had the contested legislation not been adopted, the German government claimed 
that it would have been possible for non-resident taxpayers to obtain, without entitlement 
and in advance, the tax credit allowed only to resident taxpayers by having recourse to 
86 Ibid., para. 38–39.
87 Ibid., para. 41.
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the following practice: before the distribution of dividends took place, the non-resident 
taxpayer would sell his shares in a German company to a resident taxpayer at a price 
higher than its nominal value. In particular, that price would include the corporation 
tax paid by the resident company making the distribution. Accordingly, by obtaining the 
reimbursement of the amount of the tax already paid by that company, the non-resident 
taxpayer would make a capital gain which would not be liable to tax in Germany. For 
his part, the resident taxpayer would not only obtain the tax credit corresponding to 
the shares he had acquired, but would also be able to deduct from his taxable profi ts the 
reduction in value of those shares resulting from the distribution of dividends. If those 
shares were then sold back to the non-resident taxpayer, the same practice could then be 
repeated at the next distribution. To put an end to that practice, the German legislator 
decided to adopt the contested legislation which applied where a resident taxpayer had 
acquired his shares in a resident company from a non-resident shareholder at a price 
which, for whatever reason, exceeded their nominal value.
Th e facts of the case concerned the restructuring of the Glaxo Wellcome group which 
involved the acquisition of shares of GW-GmbH (a company established in Germany) 
by GV-GmbH (a resident taxpayer) from GG-Ltd (a shareholder residing in the UK). As 
a result of that acquisition, GV-GmbH became the sole parent company of GW-GmbH. 
Similarly, that restructuring also involved the acquisition of shares of W-GmbH (a 
company established in Germany) by GW-GmbH (a resident taxpayer) from GG-Ltd and 
W-Ltd (two shareholders residing in the UK). Since GW-GmbH was the sole shareholder 
of W-GmbH, the latter was merged into the former. In spite of that merger, the German 
tax authorities took the view that GV-GmbH was not entitled to deduct from its taxable 
profi ts the losses resulting from the reduction in the value of the shares that GW-
GmbH held in W-GmbH, given that those shares had originally been purchased from 
shareholders residing in the UK. GW-GmbH challenged that decision on the ground 
that it was incompatible with EU law.
At the outset, the Court of Justice examined whether the free movement of capital or 
the freedom of establishment applied to the case at hand. It stated that ‘the application of 
[the contested legislation did] not depend on the size of the holdings acquired from the non-
resident shareholder and [was] not limited to situations in which the shareholder [could] 
exercise defi nite infl uence on the decisions of the company concerned and determine its 
activities’. Also, ‘[its] purpose [was] to prevent non-resident shareholders from obtaining 
an undue tax advantage directly through the sale of shares with the sole objective of 
obtaining that advantage’. As a result, the Court of Justice ruled that the legislation at 
issue in the main proceedings had to be examined in light of the Treaty provisions on 
the free movement of capital.88 Next, the Court of Justice went on to determine whether 
the contested legislation constituted a restriction on the free movement of capital. In that 
regard, it observed that ‘[a] taxpayer’s right to deduct from his taxable profi ts the losses 
88 Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, para. 49 and 50.
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resulting from the partial reduction in value of the shares held in the company, where the 
reduction in value of the shares results from the distribution of the profi ts, undeniably 
constitutes a tax advantage’.89 As the contested legislation limited the grant of such a 
tax advantage to a resident taxpayer who had acquired shares in a resident company 
from a resident shareholder, it made the acquisition of shares held by non-residents less 
attractive. In the same way, it dissuaded non-resident investors from acquiring shares 
in the resident company, representing an obstacle to that company’s accumulation of 
capital from other Member States.90 Th us, the Court of Justice ruled that the contested 
legislation constituted an obstacle to the free movement of capital.
Moreover, with regard to the losses resulting from a reduction in value of the shares 
held in a resident company, the Court of Justice found that ‘those shareholders are in a 
comparable situation, whether the shares are acquired from a resident or acquired from a 
non-resident’.91 ‘Th e distribution of profi ts’, the Court of Justice wrote, ‘reduces the value 
of a share, whether it was previously acquired from a resident or a non-resident, and in 
both cases that reduction in value is borne by the resident shareholder’.92 Accordingly, 
the contested legislation did not refl ect an objective diff erence in the situations of those 
shareholders. Th is meant that in order for the contested legislation to be compatible with 
the free movement of capital, it had to be justifi ed by an overriding reason in the public 
interest. In that regard, the German government argued that the contested legislation 
pursued three objectives recognized as legitimate by EU law: it sought to preserve the 
coherence of the German tax system,93 to ensure the eff ective collection of revenue 
generated in German territory94 and to prevent artifi cial arrangements whose purpose 
was to circumvent the scope of application of German legislation.95
Aft er rejecting the contention that the contested legislation was a proper means for 
ensuring the coherence of the German tax system,96 the Court of Justice noted that 
it was ‘capable of achieving the objective of maintaining a balanced allocation of the 
89 Ibid., para. 56.
90 Ibid., para. 57.
91 Ibid., para. 58.
92 Ibid., para. 73.
93 See, e.g., Case C-204/90 Bachmann, EU:C:1992:35, para. 28; Case C-319/02 Manninen, EU:C:2004:484, 
para. 42.
94 See, notably, Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, para. 46.
95 Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, para. 51 and 55; Case C-524/04 Th in Cap, para. 72 and 74; and Case 
C-330/07 Jobra, para. 3.
96 For an argument based on such a justifi cation to succeed, the Court of Justice requires that a direct link 
be established between the tax advantage concerned and the off setting of that advantage by a particular 
tax levy, with the direct nature of that link to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by 
the rules in question. However, the Court of Justice found that such a direct link did not exist, as ‘the 
disadvantages resulting from the legislation at issue in the main proceedings are suff ered directly by the 
resident shareholder who has acquired those shares from a non-resident. For that resident shareholder, 
the impossibility of deducting from his taxable profi ts the losses resulting from the reduction in the value 
of the shares held in the resident company, where the reduction in value of the shares results from the 
distribution of the profi ts, is not off set by any tax advantage’. Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, para. 80.
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power to impose taxes between the Member States and of preventing wholly artifi cial 
arrangements which do not refl ect economic reality and whose only purpose is to obtain 
a tax advantage’.97 Indeed, such legislation prevented practices with the sole objective of 
making it possible for a non-resident shareholder, who was neither a taxable person in 
Germany nor entitled to a tax credit for corporation tax paid by the resident company, 
to obtain such a tax credit. In doing so, it also ensured that profi ts liable to be taxed 
in Germany were not unduly transferred to the national tax base of another Member 
State. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that it was for the referring court to determine 
whether the contested legislation went beyond what was necessary to attain those twin 
objectives, the Court of Justice provided the national court with some guidance in that 
respect.
Th e Court of Justice opposed general assumptions according to which ‘any increase 
in the selling price necessarily takes into account the tax credit and is made solely for 
that reason’, since it cannot be ruled out that
the shares were sold at more than their nominal value for reasons other than in order to obtain 
for the shareholder a tax credit for the corporation tax paid by the resident company or, in 
any case, that the undistributed profi ts and the possibility of obtaining a tax credit relating to 
those shares constitute only one element of their selling price.98
When determining the existence of abusive practices, the Court of Justice held that 
the national court must embark on ‘a case-by-case examination, taking into account 
the particular features of each case, based on objective elements, in order to assess the 
abusive or fraudulent conduct of the persons concerned’.99 If the national court were to 
fi nd that
[the contested legislation] cannot be limited to wholly artifi cial arrangements, established 
on the basis of objective elements, but covers all cases in which a resident taxpayer has 
acquired shares in a resident company from a non-resident shareholder at a price which, for 
whatever reason, exceeds the nominal value of those shares, the eff ects of such legislation 
[would exceed] what is necessary in order to attain the objective of preventing wholly artifi cial 
arrangements which do not refl ect economic reality and whose only purpose is unduly to 
obtain a tax advantage.100
97 Ibid., para. 92.
98 Ibid., para. 96.
99 Ibid., para. 99. In the view of Advocate General Bot, the fact that shares are sold at a price higher than 
their nominal value may be an indication of abuse, but is not in itself conclusive evidence of abuse. 
He posited that one should also examine the speed with which and the price at which those shares are 
sold back to the non-resident shareholder. In addition, whilst the national legislator may establish a 
presumption of abuse, it must allow the operator concerned to rebut such a presumption by showing 
economic or fi nancial reasons or very specifi c circumstances justifying such a transaction. See Opinion 
of Advocate General Bot in Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, EU:C:2009:438, para. 175 et seq.
100 Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, para. 100.
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§5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Cadbury Schweppes, Th in Cap and Glaxo Wellcome provide national courts with useful 
guidance when they are called upon to determine whether a national measure prohibiting 
abusive practices complies with the fundamental freedoms. To that end, a national court 
must establish at the outset which of the fundamental freedoms applies. Next, it must 
examine whether the national measure at issue in the main proceedings constitutes a 
restriction on the relevant freedom. If that is indeed the case, it must look at the reasons 
that may justify such a restriction. It is thus at the justifi cation stage that the national 
court must take into account the concept of ‘abuse of law’ developed by the Court of 
Justice in Cadbury Schweppes, Th in Cap and Glaxo Wellcome.
First, the fact that the company was established in a Member State for the purpose of 
benefi ting from a more favourable tax treatment does not in itself suffi  ce to constitute an 
abuse of the relevant fundamental freedom. It follows that tax mitigation which results 
from a legitimate exercise of the right to free movement is protected by EU law.
Second, EU law does not off er a shield to tax evaders, since Member States may prevent 
taxpayers from obtaining tax advantages resulting from ‘wholly artifi cial arrangements’ 
which do not involve the genuine exercise of an economic activity. Th ose arrangements 
constitute abusive practices. In order to determine whether an arrangement is wholly 
artifi cial, Cadbury Schweppes tells national courts to examine the intention of the 
taxpayer concerned and to look at objective factors which are ascertainable by third 
parties. To state the obvious, those objective factors are not always the same but may vary 
in accordance with the arrangement in question. For example, regarding the setting up 
of a subsidiary for the purpose of obtaining a more advantageous tax treatment, Cadbury 
Schweppes indicates that those objective factors may, for example, relate to the physical 
existence in terms of premises, staff  and equipment of the subsidiary concerned (as 
opposed to a mere ‘letter-box’ subsidiary).
As to anti-avoidance rules on thin capitalisation, in the light of Th in Cap, national 
courts are advised to examine the interest paid by the resident company. Th e fact that 
that interest exceeds the amount that would have been paid at arm’s length between the 
payer and the payee of the interest, or between the companies of the same group and a 
third party, may imply the existence of abuse. Finally, regarding the off setting reduction 
in share values, national courts must look at the price at which shares are sold by the 
non-resident shareholder. However, in light of Glaxo Wellcome, that determination is 
not in itself conclusive evidence of abuse. In addition, national courts may, for instance, 
enquire as to how much time elapsed between the sale of those shares and their resale 
to the original shareholder. Moreover, it appears that the Court of Justice gives more 
weight to the existence of objective factors than to the intentions of the taxpayer 
concerned. Indeed, in Cadbury Schweppes, the Court of Justice ruled that, regardless 
of the motivation behind the exercise of the rights to free movement, in the absence of 
objective factors proving the existence of a wholly artifi cial arrangement, there cannot be 
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an abuse. However, it would be very diffi  cult for the taxpayer concerned to demonstrate 
that he did not intend to obtain a tax advantage where objective factors indicate the 
contrary.
Last but not least, regarding the principle of proportionality, the national measure 
at issue must be suffi  ciently fi nely calibrated so that it aims only at prohibiting abusive 
practices. Th is means that general and irrefutable presumptions establishing that 
certain transactions constitute abusive practices fail to comply with the principle of 
proportionality. Procedurally, Member States must allow the individual or company 
concerned to rebut such presumptions and, in any event, national courts must be able to 
assess the existence of abuse on a case-by-case basis.
